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Chapter 10
U.S. Scientific and Technical
Information Policy"
Thomas E. PineUi, Rebecca O. Barclay,
&John M. Kennedy
We begin this chapter by posing a modification of a question asked by
Ergas (1987), "Does United States (U.S.) scientific and technical informa-
tion (STI) policy matter?" We think, it does. STI is an essential ingredient
of technological innovation. After reviewing the available literature,
Fischer (1980) concluded that STI is central to the process of technologi-
cal innovation; the management of STI can improve the efficacy of the
innovation process; and the ability of engineers and scientists to identify,
acquire, and use STI positively correlates with technical performance at
both the indi,Adual and group levels. Successful technological innovation
results in economic growth and competitiveness within today's global econ-
omy. It contributes to increased producti,_ity, growth in employment, real
wage growth, and an increased standard of living. However, STI in and of
itself does not make for successful innovation. Innovation-adoption deci-
sions are seldom made on the basis of "advances in systemic knowledge of
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and not necessarily those
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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the useful arts," otherwise known as STI (David, 1986, p. 387). They are, for
the most part, investment decisions and are influenced, to a large extent,
by a variety of government policies, laws, and regulations. Conventional
wisdom holds that a well-articulated and coordinated set of policies at the
Federal level is needed to create a climate conducive to successful techno-
logical innovation within the United States. A coherent, integrated pro-
gram derived from policies that emphasize the identification, acquisition,
and utilization of STI resulting from the U.S. government's investment in
science and technology should be included as a part of that coordinated set
of Federal policies.
The U.S. government spent about $68 billion in FY1994 for science and
technology (Office of Management and Budget, 1994, p. 131). There is
general agreement among policy-makers that the results of this expendi-
ture can be used to enhance technological innovation and improve eco-
nomic competitiveness. Unfortunately, the United States has no coherent
STI policy, and it lacks a coherent or systematically-designed approach to
transferring the results of its investment in STI to the u_er (BaUard et al.,
1989). What the United States does have, however, is many programs and
numerous policies that cut across political jurisdictions, and the idiosyn-
cratic missions and mandates of single agencies that are more or less
responsive to a series of shifting political alliances and imperatives. Gold
(1993) supports and expands this position by stating that the system which
handles Federal STI is _uncoordinated, fragmented, and often ineffectual"
(p. 222). Gold further states that the existing Federal STI system suffers
from the absence of coherent policy guidelines.
The absence of a cohesive policy and STI policy framework means that
the transfer and utilization of STI goes uncoordinated; there is no central-
ity concerning the identification and resolution of issues. Although the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has a mandate to "pro-
mote the transfer and utilization of STI for civilian needs, to consider the
potential role of information technology in the information transfer
process, and to coordinate federal STI policies and practices," in general,
OSTP has not fulfilled this legislative directive (Pinelli et al., 1992, p. 41).
This chapter examines the U.S. government's role in funding science
and technology, reviews Federal STI activities and involvement in the trans-
fer and use of STI resulting from federally-funded science and technology,
presents issues surrounding the use of federally-funded STI, and offers rec-
ommendations for improving the transfer and use of STI. The term "fed-
erally-funded STI" includes data, information, and knowledge created by
engineers and scientists working in the Federal (national) laboratories and
research centers, and knowledge created by engineers and scientists
employed in academia and industry who are working under Federal
research grants or contracts. Finally, this chapter does not view science and
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technology as a continuous or normal progress from basic research (sci-
ence) through applied research (technology) to development (utiliza-
tion). We agree with Allen (1977) that the relationship between science
and technology is not continuous but is perhaps best described as a series
of interactions based on need rather than a normal progression. The idea
of science and technology as a continuous process is based on the widely-
held assumption that technology grows out of or is dependent upon sci-
ence for its development. The belief that technological change is somehow
based on scientific advance has, however, been challenged in recent years
(see Kline, 1985; Shapley & Roy, 1985). This assumed relationship between
science and technology is the foundation upon which U.S. science and
technology policy is based. It has shaped much of the exisdng Federal sci-
ence and technology policy and its framework and may help explain the
use of the conventional phrase "scientists and engineers."
Technology may well be the critical factor in the long-term economic
growth of the United States. It functions successfully, however, only within
a larger social environment that provides an effective combination of
incentives and complementary inputs into the innovation process.
Technology, unlike science, is an extroverted activity; it involves a search for
workable solutions to problems. When technology finds solutions that are
workable and effective, it does not pursue the 'why'. Moreover, the output
of technology is usually a product, process, or service. Science, by contrast,
is an introverted activity. It studies problems that are usually generated
internally by logical discrepancies or internal inconsistencies or by anom-
alous observations that cannot be accounted for within the present intel-
lectual framework (Landau & Rosenberg, 1986). Technology is a process
dominated by engineers, rather than scientists, which leads to different
philosophies and habits regarding the use and production of STI. U.S. STI
policy should reflect ,hat distinction.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The importance of science and technology to the nation was recognized by
the framers of the Constitution. Specifically, the Constitution of the United
States contains a provision (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8) empowering the
Congress to enact laws relating to patents:
Congress shall have the power.., to promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts, by securing for limited dmes to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective wridngs and discoveries.
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Before the Constitution was adopted, the various colonies granted patents.
The first United States patent was granted on July 30, 1790. The Patent Act
of 1836 provided for the establishment of the Patent and Trademark OfFice
under the direction of a Commissioner of Patents. A patent is a protection
granted by a government to an inventor to prevent unauthorized exploita-
tion of an invention and is distinguished from a trademark and a copyright.
(Copyrights are registered with the Copyright Office in the Library of
Congress.)
Over the years, Congress has enacted legislation affecting what is
patentable. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83--703), inventions
useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or nuclear energy
for weapons cannot be patented (Subramanyam, 1981). The Government
Research and Development Patent Policy Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-620) estab-
lished uniform government policy regarding patent rights to inventions
resulting from federally-funded science and technology. The Federal
Science and Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-502) amended the
Stevenson-Wydler Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96--480) and changed gov-
ernment policy on patent rights for inventions created in Federal labora-
tories and resulting from cooperative research and development (R&D)
agreements with the Federal government. Passage of these acts reflected a
recent but increasing involvement and growing interest in science and
technology by the U.S. government. Prior to World War II, Federal involve-
ment in science and technology was limited to specific agencies, depart-
mental programs, and functions (e.g., national defense) that were
considered to be the government's sole responsibility.
Pre-World War H
In detailing the involvement of the U.S. government in science and tech-
nology, it is important to understand that the present day involvement in
and expenditures for science and technology represent a dramatic depar-
ture from earlier arrangements. World War II marked a sharp departure
from the role previously played by the U.S. government with respect to
financial support for science and technology activities that were not tied
direcdy and explicidy to an existing Federal responsibility. Early examples
of Federal involvement include the establishment of the Coast and
Geodetic Sur_'ey, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Weather Bureau, the
National Bureau of Standards, and a host of public works projects and
medical programs conducted under the auspices of the military. (For addi-
tional information, see Dupree, 1986.)
To illustrate the issue of appropriate "Federal responsibility," we con-
sider the creation of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. The
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actual debate in Congress regarding the acceptance of James Smithson's
1829 bequest lasted for years. Congress founded the Smithsonian
Institution in 1846. Support for agricultural research, perhaps the oldest
Federal commitment to science and technology, was also subjected to pro-
tracted congressional debate. The Morrill Act, which established the
nation's land-grant colleges, passed both houses of Congress in 1859 but
was vetoed by President Buchanan. The Act became law in 1862 and the
Department of Agriculture was established the same year. Litde research
was performed by the land-grant colleges undl the Hatch Act, which pro-
vided Federal funding for agricultural experiment stations, was passed in
1887. Until the Second World War, agriculture continued to occupy its
long-standing position of being the only sector of the economy to receive
research-funding support from the Federal government. Although the
Federal agricultural research establishment--with its land-grant colleges,
agricultural experiment stations, and the state agricultural extension pro-
grams that bring research results to the farmer and the farmer's agricul-
tural problems back to the research establishmentnhas been criticized in
recent years, the system is widely regarded as "probably the most successful
government effort to date in stimulating the innovation process" (Coles,
1983, p. 36).
With the creation of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), the United States government created a Federal research labora-
tory (i.e., the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory) that began to
"investigate the scientific problems involved in flight and to give advice to
the military air services and other aviation services of the government"
(P.L. 63-271, The Naval Appropriations Act, 1916). Considering the obvi-
ous connection to national defense, passage of this legislation did not
come easily. After considerable debate, the legislation creating the NACA
was passed as a rider to the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916. The NACA
has been described as arguably the most important and productive aero-
nautical research establishment in the world. Between its creation in 1917
and its demise in 1958, the NACA published more than 16,000 technical
reports that were sought after and exploited by aeronautical engineers and
scientists throughout the United States and abroad (Roland, 1985). Many
of these reports, classics in the fields of aerodynamics and aeronautics, are
still used and referenced; the data contained therein are essential to under-
standing the fundamentals of aeronautical research (Anderson, 1974). The
NACA has been cited by scholars as a model for Federal involvement in sci-
ence and technology (Teich, 1985) and pre-commercial research coopera-
tion between the public and private sectors (Nelson, 1982). Vannevar Bush
(1945) proposed a similar model for the creation of his National Research
Foundation that was based on a composite of the Federal agricultural
research establishment and the NACA. Both offered science, applied
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science, technology, and a system for coupling the user with knowledge
resulting from these programs.
World War H
Entry of the United States into World War II permanently transformed the
Federal government with respect to financial support for science and tech-
nology. From 1940 to 1945, total Federal expenditures for science and tech-
nology rose from $83.2 million to $1,314 million, with the bulk of the funds
being expended by the Department of Defense (Mowery & Rosenberg,
1989). Two events from this period are noteworthy. The first is the
Manhattan Project. The successful completion of this project ushered in
the age of "big science" and helped shape the postwar imagination about
the "more constructive possibilities of science when it could be applied in
an organized and systematic way to the pursuit of human goals"
(Rosenberg, 1985, p. 5). The second is the OfFice of Scientific Research
and Development (OSRD) under the direction of Vannevar Bush. OSRD
entered into contracts with the private sector (i.e., academia and industry)
for research. Prior to World War II, almost all federally-funded science and
technology was performed by the government itselfDby civil servants in
Federal research centers and laboratories. The success of these contractual
arrangements with the private sector dramatically influenced the organiza-
tion of federally-funded science and technology in the post-World War II
era. This arrangement effectively split the responsibility for the conduct of
science and technology between the public and private sectors. Overall
resource allocation decisions remained with the Federal government while
academia and industry were given considerable autonomy in terms of prob-
lem formulation and approach.
Post-World War H
World War II marked a sharp departure from the role previously played by
the U.S. government in science and technology with respect to financial
support for research not directly or explicitly tied to a specific Federal
agency or program. "In spite of the permissive implications of the general
welfare clause of the U.S. Constitution, Federal support for science and
technology prior to World War II had been limited sharply by a strict inter-
pretation of the role of the government" (Teich, 1985). Rosenberg (1985)
provides the following historical observation:
What has emerged since the Second World War is a system in which the
Federal government has become the dominant purchaser of R&D, but with-
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out, at the same time, becoming the dominant performer of R&D. Thus, the
unique institutional development has been the manner in which the Federal
government has accepted a vastly broadened financial responsibility for R&D
without arranging simultaneously for its in-house performance. Rather, pri-
vate industry has become the main performer of Federal R&D, and the uni-
versity community the main performer of the basic research component.
Thus, the enlarged role of the Federal government in the support of R&D
has been carried out within an institutional framework dominated by con-
tractual relationships between the Federal government and private perform-
ers. (p. 2)
From this policy emerged the concept of"spinoff and dual-use;" that is, sci-
ence and technology that serves the immediate purpose(s) of the govern-
ment can also be "commercialized" by the private sector.
Commercialization would automatically occur as a by-product of Federal
support for basic research in the academic community and agency (i.e.,
Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) support for applied research in the private sector
(Alic et al., 1992)).
U.S. government science and technology policy after World War II was
based largely on the arguments advanced in Science: The Endless Frontier
(Bush, 1945). Principally, government-funded research in science and
technology serves as a means to improve health, defend the nation, fuel
economic growth, and provide jobs in new industries (Smith, 1990). Events
such as the Korean War and Sputnik, the increased use of science and tech-
nology by the Federal government to solve social problems in the late 1960s
and 1970s, the energy crisis, the "War on Cancer," the Vietnam War, and,
more recently, a widening concern in the late 1980s and 1990s over the
apparent decline in U.S. internati_onal competitiveness have helped shape
U.S. S&T policy and account for the growth of federally-funded science
and technology (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of
Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, 1986).
In recent years, however, members of Congress, citizens, and policy- and
decision-makers have expressed concern that perhaps the results of the bil-
lions of dollars spent annually by the Federal government for science and
technology may not be well-utilized. In other words, the American public
may not be receiving an "adequate" return on their investment (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1986). Other than during President Reagan's first
term in office, the legitimacy of the United States in providing financial
support for science and technology has gone virtually unchallenged. On
the other hand, Helping America Compete (Office of Technology Assessment,
1990) is one of the latest in a series of studies, stretching over 30 years,
which concludes that the United States should make better use of the
knowledge resulting from federally-funded science and technology (Wood,
1991).
218 PINELLI, BARCLAY,, f_ KF3YNED Y
Competing in a Global Economy
During the Cold War, the focus of Federal science and technology policy
was military superiority. During the 1960s, federally-funded science and
technology was seen as a means of solving such pressing social problems as
inadequate housing, declining environmental, quality, and even poverty
(Averch, 1985). The familiar refrain from this period was the question: _If
we can put a man on the moon, why can't we...?" (Nelson, 1977).
Beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing even today is the belief that
federally-funded science and technology plays a major role in the economy
and the competitiveness of the United States in a global economy. This
position is based on the belief that science and technology are the under-
pinnings of technological innovation, which, in turn, has been seen as the
key to economic growth and international economic competitiveness
(Logsdon, 1986).
Economists like Mansfield (1968; Mansfield et al., 1982) have shown a
positive correlation between the funding of science and technology and
economic growth. Economists are also quick to point out, however, that the
relationship between spending and economic growth is hard to predict, is
often indirect, and is difficult to measure because the transformation of the
results of that spending into economically successful technological innova-
tion depends on a variety of factors such as government fiscal, domestic,
trade, and national security policy, all of which fall outside the scope of sci-
ence and technology policy. Furthermore, Federal science and technology
policy is shaped by and must be responsive to many groups and con-
stituencies. The goal of federally-funded science and technology is not
profitability, but rather a means to achieving various social, political, and
economic objectives; expanding the knowledge base; and supporting edu-
cation and training.
Existing U.S. science and technology policy desires to increase techno-
logical innovation and increase the commercialization of federally-funded
science and technology. Policy goals include improving domestic efficiency
(i.e., productivity, wages, and jobs) and enhancing the international com-
petitiveness of the United States. These goals have been justified in a polit-
ical sense based on an economic concept known as externalities (Eads,
1974). Simply put, this concept holds that private firms underinvest in tech-
nological innovation which, the concept holds, constitutes a failure of the
market. (For an explanation of externalities and market failures, see Baer,
Johnson, & Merrow, 1977). It is the failure of the market that justifies inter-
vention by the government in the form of financial support for science and
technology. Action on the part of the government is meant to supplement,
not supplant, the market through the creation (i.e., production) of data,
information, and knowledge resulting from federally-funded science and
technology.
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Current U.S. science and technology policy is not without its critics, how-
ever. They argue that this policy does not take into account the factors and
influences that motivate innovation. Doing so, they state, would increase
the likelihood of successful technological innovation. Early on, Nelson and
Winter (1977) and Pavitt and Walker (1976) and more recently Branscomb
(1991) criticized this "supply-side" policy (i.e., producing knowledge)
because it encourages innovation, not its adoption; knowledge transfer and
utilization are very inadequately served by market forces. Further, they
argue, this policy provides little incentive for knowledge transfer and uti-
lization. They conclude that government would better serve public policy
by formulating policies that encourage the diffusion (i.e., the production,
transfer, arid use) of knowledge. Mowery (1983) states that a theoretical
economic framework for technological innovation that ignores or does not
account for the effective transmission and utilization of complex research
results and STI is inappropriate for developing Federal science and tech-
nology policy because it ignores the abilities and limitations of organiza-
tions engaged in technological innovation to exploit extramural research
(i.e., the results of federally-funded science and technology), thus ignoring
the relationship among the production, transfer, and utilization of knowl-
edge as equally important components of the innovation process. Mowery
(1985) further states:
This theoretical [economic] framework focuses primarily on the putative
undersupply of research and bases its recommendations for policy on this
market failure. However, for policy purposes, the distribution and utilization
of the results of research and development are crucial. An exclusive focus on
the R&D support policies of the Federal government, without some cog-
nizance of the substantial diffusion support component of the policy struc-
ture, yields conclusions that differ substantially from those of an analysis that
attempts to incorporate both the technology supply and technology adoption
incentives operating within the overall policy framewoi'k. (p. 34)
Commenting on technology diffusion, public policy, and industrial com-
petitiveness in the United States, David (1986) concluded that attempts by
the Federal government to promote successful technological innovation
rest more with knowledge transfer and utilization and less with knowledge
production. In concluding this point, David states that:
Innovation has become our cherished child, doted upon by all concerned
with maintaining competitiveness and renewing failing industries; whereas
diffusion (i.e., transfer and utilization) has fallen into the woeful role of
Cinderella, a drudge-like creature who tends to be overlooked when the sum-
mons arrives to attend the technology policy ball. (p. 377)
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The apparent success of Federal involvement in agriculture and aviation
contrasts sharply with the results of the government's attempts to stimulate
technological innovation in the civilian economy. It appears that in the
case of agriculture and aviation, the government utilized a long-term, holis-
tic approach to technological innovation that emphasized the production,
transfer, and use of federally-funded science and technology in a coordi-
nated policy environment.
THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AND STI
The U.S. government has been producing STI for over 200 years.
Traditionally, the Federal government has limited the distribution of this
STI to activities either direcdy or explicitly tied to an existing responsibility
of a specific government agency, to an activity that supports a specific gov-
ernment agency (i.e., government contractor or grantee), or to a group of
citizens identified by the legislation that created the specific government
agency. Under this policy, such Federal entities as agriculture would bejus-
tiffed in distributing the results of federally-funded science and technology
to farmers and members of the agricultural community. Historically, STI
activities were limited; they were organized to support specific agencies and
departmental programs, not to carry out the coordinated distribution of
Federal STI. For most of its history then, the United States has had no over-
all, coordinated Federal policy for STI. (For a history of Federal STI activ-
ities, see Adkinson, 1987.) Although the U. S. government has been
involved in creating, supporting, and distributing STI virtually since the
founding of the nation, this chapter concentrates on the post-World War II
period, the creation of the STI clearinghouses, and the U.S. government
technical report.
U.S. Government Clearinghouses for STI
If World War II marked a significant departure from the Federal govern-
ment's role with respect to financing science and technology, it also sig-
naled the beginning of an era in which it was assumed the U.S. government
had the primary responsibility to provide access to the results of its invest-
ment in science and technology (Ballard et al., 1989). The primary argu-
ment for this assumption stems from the role of the government as a major
funder of science and technology and the corresponding need for a uni-
form approach to disseminating the results of its investment in science and
technology (Pinelli & Henderson, 1989). U. S. government funding for sci-
ence and technology during this period focused on the applied or, as Bush
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(1945) would say, "the purposeful nature of science and technology," with
the majority of Federal funds for science and technology being allocated to
DoD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), and NASA. With the exception of HHS, each of
these agencies created information clearinghouses and supporting special-
ized information services to acquire, reproduce, announce, and distribute
the results of government-funded science and "technology. The National
Technical Information Service (NTIS) was established as the central source
for public sale of technical reports containing the results of research per-
formed or sponsored by the U.S. government and for the sale of "war time
[i.e., Axis countries] reports" captured by the Allies. (See Richards, 1994,
for a discussion of this topic.) At the same time, advances in computer tech-
nology were applied to indexing and abstracting and to the creation of a
variety of Federal online databases. (For information on Federal STI from
1945 to 1990, see Pinelli, Henderson, Bishop, & Doty, 1992.) Policy con-
cerning access to, and the distribution of, federally-funded STI during the
post-World War II period focused primarily on "free and open vs. restricted
access" for reasons of national security. (See Relyea, 1994, for a discussion
of this issue.)
The U.S. Government Technical Report
The technical report has become synonymous with documenting and
reporting the results of federally-funded science and technology (Pinelli,
Barclay, & Kennedy, 1993). According to Adkinson (1987), "distribution of
printed results of federally funded science and technology changed from
almost complete reliance on traditional journals and monographs to wide-
spread use of the government technical report" (p. 29). The development
of the U.S. government technical report, according to Godfrey and
Redman (1973), dates back to 1941 and the establishment of the OSRD.
Further, the growth of the U.S. government technical report coincides with
the expanding role of DoD in science and technology during the post-
World War II era and the classification of research results for reasons of
national security. U.S. government technical reports have, however, existed
for several decades. The Bureau of Mines Reports of Investigation (Redman,
1965/1966), the Professional Papers of the United States Geological Survey, and
the Technological Papers of the National Bureau of Standards (Auger, 1975) are
early examples of U.S. government technical reports. Perhaps the first U.S.
government publications officially created to document the results of fed-
erally-funded science and technology were the technical reports first pub-
lished by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in
1917.
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McClure (1988) concludes that "we know very litde about the role,
importance, and the impact of this literature vis-a-vis the transfer of feder-
ally-funded STI, technological innovation, and productivity" (p. 42). Our
analyses of the literature support the following conclusions regarding U.S.
government technical reports (Pinelli, Barclay_ & Kennedy, 1993).
• Although the U.S. government technical report has been variously
reviewed, compared, and contrasted, there is no real knowledge base
regarding the role, production, use, and importance of this informa-
tion product in terms of knowledge diffusion, technological innovation,
and productivity.
• The body of available knowledge is simply inadequate and non-compa-
rable to determine the role played by the U.S. government technical
report in transferring the results of federally-funded science and tech-
nology.
• Further, most of the available knowledge is largely anecdotal, is limited
in scope and dated, and is unfocused in the sense that it lacks a con-
ceptual framework.
• The available knowledge does not lend itself to developing "normal-
ized" answers to questions regarding U.S. government technical
reports.
U. S. Government STI Poficy
The early enthusiastic support for increased financial support for science
and technology also carried over into Federal STI. That initial enthusiasm
has degenerated to produce a system that is passive, fragmented, and unfo-
cused, and is largely unresponsive in a user context (Ballard et al., 1989).
In making this statement, we recognize that, unlike the Soviet Union, the
United States made a conscious decision not to build a single, centralized
system or facilitw for STI. It did, however, intend the Federal STI enterprise
to be coordinated and purposeful. Much of the reason for the fragmented
and unfocused nature of the existing Federal STI system can be attributed
to politics. The COSATI (Committee on Scientific and Technical
Information) was created in 1964 under the auspices of the Federal
Council for Science and Technology ostensibly to provide leadership and
to coordinate Federal STI activities. COSATI was transferred in 1971 from
the Office of Science and Technology (OST) to the National Science
Foundation (NSF), where it was abolished the following year. The abolition
of the Office of Science Information within NSF essentially ended govern-
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ment-supported research for STI. These two events, coupled with the fail-
ure of OSTP to fulfill its congressional mandate with respect to STI, have
contributed to a Federal system with no coherent, policy-oriented, system-
atically-clesigned approach to STI. Through the years, the role of various
government agencies involved in STI has become increasingly passive and
blurred. The basic infrastructure created by the Federal government to col-
lect, distribute, and disseminate STI has changed little since its creation,
although the Cold War has ended, dramatic advances in computer and
information technology have occurred, and the ability of the United States
to compete effectively in a global market has been questioned. One effort
to remedy the STI leadership void has been the formation of CENDI
(Commerce, Energy, NASA, and Defense Information), a loose federation
of Federal entities working together to develop standards and solve STI
problems common to CENDI agencies. Although the efforts of CENDI are
admirable, they fall short of the leadership and coordinated policy that is
needed to improve the Federal STI enterprise (Gold, 1993).
The problems associated with the Federal STI system are not entirely
new. Numerous government-sponsored studies concerned with Federal STI
have been conducted over the past 30 years. The major studies of Federal
STI policy in terms of content, the analysis of the context in which they
were produced, and the results they generated were analyzed by Bishop
and Fellows (1989). From their analysis, these researchers concluded that
"today's imperfect federal STI system is not due to a lack of informative
studies.., but rather the failure of the studies' producers to influence pol-
icy makers" (p. S). Perhaps this conclusion is a bit harsh considering that
the individuals who conducted the studies were hired to analyze the pre-
sent state of Federal STI and not to influence policy-makers. Instead, we
find ourselves agreeing with Gold's (1993) conclusion that much of the
blame for the current state of the Federal STI enterprise rests with the lack
of Executive Branch leadership and the lack of coordination with respect
to Federal STI.
Existing Federal STI policy is not tied to Federal science and technology
policy. Rather, it is derived from the generic government information pol-
icy that is binding on Executive Branch agencies through Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular No. A-130, "Management of
Federal Information Resources." OMB Circular No. A-130 sets standards
and guidelines as to how Federal agencies should manage their informa-
tion and information technology. Critics argue that Circular No. A-130 is
generic and does not distinguish according to _type" of information. In
effect, OMB holds that Federal STI does not exhibit unique characteristics
that would warrant its being considered in a separate policy framework.
Critics also content that Circular No. A-130 gives precious little attention to
the dissemination of Federal STI. After examining the relationship
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between government information and Federal STI, Sprehe (1995) con-
cluded that the Federal government should develop special government-
wide policies, similar to OMB Circular No. A-130, for Federal STI. What
Executive Branch agency or department would have the oversight for
Federal STI policy? The natural candidate for issuing Federal STI policy
would seem to be OSTE However, Brown (1987) states that OSTP has such
a mandate but has never shown either the interest or the ability to carry out
its mandate under EL. 94--282, The National Science and Technology
Policy, Organization and Priorities Act of 1976.
The Dissemination of Federal STI
Three paradigms---appropriability, dissemination, and diffusion--have
dominated the dissemination of Federal STI (Ballard et al., 1989; Williams
& Gibson, 1990). Whereas variations of them have been tried within dif-
ferent agencies, overall Federal STI dissemination activities continue to be
driven by a supply-side, dissemination model. Scholars such as Branscomb
(1991) argue, however, that this approach and the trickle-dinah benefits asso-
ciated with the funding of basic research and mission-oriented (i.e.,
applied) research are inadequate in terms of stimulating technological
innovation and competitiveness. Branscomb (1992) advocates the adop-
tion of a diffusion-oriented policy for U.S. science and technology to gain a
competitive advantage in the emerging global economy.
The appropriability model emphasizes the production of knowledge by the
Federal government that would not otherwise be produced by the pri,,_te
sector, and competitive market pressures to promote the use of that knowl-
edge. This model emphasizes the production of basic research as the dri-
ving force behind technological development and'economic growth and
assumes that the Federal provision of science and technology will be
rapidly assimilated by the private sector. Deliberate transfer mechanisms
and intervention by information intermediaries are viewed as unnecessary..
Appropriability stresses the supply (production) of knowledge in sufficient
quantity to attract potential users. Good technologies, according to this
model, sell themselves and offer clear policy recommendations regarding
Federal priorities for improving technological development and economic
growth. This model incorrectly assumes that the results of federally-funded
science and technology will be acquired and used by the private sector,
ignores the fact that most basic research is irrelevant to technological inno-
vation, and dismisses the process of technological innovation within the
firm.
The dissemination model emphasizes the need to transfer information to
potential users and embraces the belief that the production of quality
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knowledge is not sufficient to ensure its fullest use. Linkage mechanisms,
such as information intermediaries, are needed to identify useful knowl-
edge and to transfer it to potential users. This model assumes that if these
mechanisms are available to link potential users with knowledge producers,
then better opportunities exist for users to determine what knowledge is
available, acquire it, and apply it to their needs. The strength of this model
rests on the recognition that STI transfer and use are critical elements of
the process of technological innovation. Its weakness lies in its passive
nature, for the model does not take users into consideration except when
they enter the system and request assistance. The existing Federal STI sys-
tem is based on a dissemination model and employs one-way, source-to-user
transfer procedures that are seldom responsive in the user context. User
requirements are seldom known or considered in the design of informa-
tion products and services.
The overall problem with the total Federal STI system is that "the pre-
sent system for transferring the results of federally funded STI is passive,
fragmented, and unfocused" (Bikson, Quint, & Johnson, 1984, p. 22);
effective knowledge transfer is hindered by the fact that the Federal gov-
ernment "has no coherent or systematically designed approach to transfer-
ring the results of federally funded research to the user" (Ballard et al.,
1989, p. 4). In their study of issues and options in Federal STI, Bikson,
Quint, and Johnson (1984) found that many of the interviewees believed
"dissemination activities were afterthoughts, undertaken without serious
commitment by federal agencies whose primary concerns were with
[knowledge] production and not with knowledge transfer;" therefore,
"much of what has been learned about [STI] and knowledge transfer has
not been incorporated into federally supported information transfer activ-
ities" (p. 23).
The existing Federal STI system has informal and formal components.
Problematic to the informal part of the system is that knowledge users can
learn from collegial contacts only what those contacts happen to know.
Ample evidence supports the claim that no one researcher can know about
or keep up with all the research in his/her area(s) of interest. Like other
members of the scientific community, engineers and scientists are faced
with the problem of too much information to know about, to keep up with,
and to screen. Further, information is becoming more interdisciplinary in
nature and more international in scope.
Two problems exist with the formal part of the system. First, it employs
one-way, source-to-user transmission. The problem with this kind of trans-
mission is that such formal one-way, "supply side" transfer procedures do
not seem to be responsive to the user context (Bikson, Quint, &Johnson,
1984). Rather, these efforts appear to start with an information system into
which the users' requirements are retrofitted (Adam, 1975). The consen-
sus of the findings from the empirical research is that interactive, two-way
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communications are required for effective information transfer (Bikson,
Quint, &Johnson, 1984).
Second, it relies heavily on information intermediaries to complete the
knowledge transfer process, but a strong methodological base for measur-
ing or assessing the effectiveness of the information intermediary, is lacking
(Beyer & Trice, 1982). In addition, empirical data on the effectiveness of
information intermediaries and the role(s) they play in knowledge transfer
are sparse and inconclusive. The impact of information intermediaries is
likely to be strongly conditional and limited to a specific institutional con-
text.
According to Roberts and Frohman (1978), most Federal approaches to
knowledge utilization have been ineffective in stimulating the diffusion of
technological innovation. They claim that the numerous Federal STI pro-
grams are _highest in frequency and expense yet lowest in impact" and that
federal _information dissemination activities have led to litde documented
knowledge utilization" (p. 36). Roberts and Frohman also note that "gov-
ernmental programs start to encourage utilization of knowledge only after
the research results have been generated" rather than during the idea
development phase of the innovation process (p. 36). David (1986),
Mowery (1983), and Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) conclude that success-
ful [Federal] technological innovation rests more with the transfer and uti-
lization of knowledge than with its production.
The knowledge diffusion model is grounded in theory and practice associ-
ated with the diffusion of innovation and planned change research and the
clinical models of social research and mental health. Knowledge diffusion
emphasizes "active" intervention as opposed to dissemination and access;
stresses intervention and reliance on interpersonal communications as a
means of identifying and removing interpersonal barriers between users
and producers; and assumes that knowledge production, transfer, and use
are equally important components of the innovation process. This
approach also emphasizes the link between producers, transfer agents, and
users, and seeks to develop user-oriented mechanisms (e.g., products and
services) specifically tailored to the needs and circumstances of the user. It
makes the assumption that the results of federally-funded science and tech-
nology will be underutilized unless they are relevant to users and ongoing
relationships are developed among users and producers. The problem with
the knowledge diffusion model is that (1) it requires a large Federal role
and presence, and (2) it runs contrary to the dominant assumptions of
established Federal science and technology policy. Although U.S. science
and technology policy relies on a "dissemination-oriented" approach to STI
transfer, other industrialized nations, such as Germany and Japan, are
adopting _diffusion-oriented" policies that increase the power to absorb
and employ new technologies productively (Branscomb, 1991, 1992).
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is general agreement among policy-makers that Federal STI can be
used to enhance technological innovation and improve the economic com-
petitiveness of the United States. This agreement is based on the results of
studies that show a positive relationship between STI and successful inno-
vation, technical performance, and increased .productivity. However, the
United States lacks a coherent or systematically-designed approach to
transferring federally-funded STI to the user. Policv instruments such as
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (EL. 96-480),
the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (EL. 99-502), the Japanese
Technical Literature Act of 1986 (EL. 99-382), the American Technology
Preeminence Act of 1991 (EL. 102-245), Executive Order (E.O.) 12591,
"Facilitating Access to Science and Technology" (April 10, 1987), E.O.
12881, "Establishing the National Science and Technology Council
(NSTC)" (November 23, 1993), and OMB Circular No. A-130 have shaped
the legislative and regulatory environment for Federal STI policy.
Excluding OMB Circular No. A-130, the intent of these instruments is to
(1) develop a predominant position for the United States in international
markets by facilitating technology transfer from government laboratories,
and (2) provide the inducements for Federal engineers and scientists to
nurture the transfer process. In addition, some of these instruments pro-
vide a mechanism for the collection and dissemination of foreign STI in
the United States. The scope of Circular No. A-130, which is concerned
with the management of information as a resource, includes Federal STI.
According to Circular No. A-130, STI conforms to a standard information
life cycle and does not exhibit any unique attributes calling for the forma-
tion and implementation of a separate information policy framework.
Attempts by OMB to regulate STI with a single policy instrument fail to rec-
ognize the linkages between Federal science and technology policy and
federally-funded STI; thus, from a policy standpoint, OMB Circular No. A-
130 does not contribute to congressional attempts to promote innovation
and competitiveness (Hernon & Pinelli, 1992).
A holistic approach to technological innovation and economic compet-
itiveness must be adopted at the Federal level. The current "supply-side"
STI dissemination policy emphasizing knowledge production and the
"trickle-down" benefits associated with the funding of basic research and
mission-oriented, applied research are inadequate for developing a much-
needed U.S. science and technology policy. The current approach will sim-
ply not restore the United States to a more competitive footing with other
industrialized countries. A new approach to U.S. science and technology
policy should be based on the assumption that the production, transfer,
and use of STI is inextricably linked to successful technological innovation;
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that a positive relationship exists between Federal attempts to stimulate
technological innovation and federally-funded STI; that the process of
technological innovation is best served by a "knowledge diffusion"-based
model; and that an STI transfer infrastructure, funded and coordinated as
a partnership among American industry, academia, and the Federal gov-
ernment, is required for the nation to become competitive in the global
marketplace of the 1990s and beyond. Consequently, Federal policy with
respect to technological innovation and economic competitiveness would,
by definition, include an STI component. In other words, U.S. STI policy
would be tied to U.S. science and technology policy, not to a generic infor-
mation policy instrument such as OMB Circular No. A-130 or to a particu-
lar computer and information processing technology.
This approach recognizes the need to maximize the diffusion of feder-
ally-funded STI and to coordinate Federal STI activities using a mechanism
similar to the now-defunct COSATI. A strong science and technology pol-
icy would commit the United States to building and maintaining a tech-
nology infrastructure that includes an STI transfer component based on a
knowledge diffusion model. This model should have an "activist" compo-
nent that emphasizes both domestic and imported STI, and it should be
responsive in a "user" context. U.S. science and technology policy would
view the structure, organization, and management of STI as a strategic
resource. The need for more frequent and more effective use of STI char-
acterizes the strategic version of today's competitive marketplace. STI pol-
icy should also reflect this same strategic vision for the following reasons:
• Information technology is making the same STI available at the same
time to all competitors.
• The marketplace is increasingly characterized by a growing number of
stakeholders whose numbers and positions are constantly changing.
This implies that a broader array of STI will be needed for decision-
making, and that simply providing STI retrieval and access without pro-
viding interpretation and analysis is meaningless.
• The need to provide STI interpretation and analysis is critical because
less time is available for making decisions and the half-life of informa-
tion is getting shorter.
Increasing U.S. collaboration with foreign producers will result in a
more international manufacturing environment. These alliances will result
in a more rapid diffusion of technology, and increasing pressure on U.S.
companies to push forward with new technological developments and to
take steps designed to maximize the inclusion of recent technological
developments into the innovation process. Empirically-derived knowledge
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is needed to formulate an appropriate model for developing a holistic and
conceptual U.S. science and technology and STI policy. Policy research is
needed to understand the process of technological innovation and the
relationship between STI and technological innovation. The existing
Federal STI transfer mechanism should be studied, and descriptive and
analytical data regarding the producer, information intermediary, and end-
user interfaces should be collected and analyzed.
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